This paper investigates the valuation effects of share block transfers and employs agency theory to explain the determinants of equity block premia. A sample of transactions from Poland is used to measure the benefits and costs of ownership concentration. Block premia are found to be substantially lower than in well-developed markets, in spite of the weaker minority shareholders' protection in transitional economies. Shareholders expect to benefit from intensified monitoring and from corporate restructuring resulting from block acquisitions. Still, shareholders are wary of the expropriation stemming from the extraction of private benefits of control by block holders. The opportunities to extract such benefits are found to depend not only on the size of the block holder's stake, but also on the relative power of other investors. Finally, the results document a positive role of the State as an investor in listed companies.
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Introduction
The presence of agency conflicts between shareholders and managers who control corporate resources in modern companies has led to the emergence of governance mechanisms assuring that financiers' funds are not expropriated or wasted on unattractive projects (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) . In a vast majority of European countries, ownership concentration is one of the most important internal mechanisms of corporate governance (Becht and Röell, 1999) .
Minority shareholders' protection in these countries is weaker than in Anglo-American ones (La Porta et al., 1998) , and therefore, only large blocks, carrying significant control power, provide appropriate guarantees for investors. This paper takes an agency perspective to explain both costs and benefits of ownership concentration. Large block holdings help to curb agency problems between shareholders, who finance companies, and managers, who control corporate resources on a day-to-day basis (Admati et al., 1994; Maug, 1998; Kahn and Winton, 1994 ). Yet, delegation of monitoring to large shareholders may be a source of other agency problems that emerge for various stakeholders of a firm (Burkart et al., 2000) . As neither the costs, nor the benefits of ownership concentration are directly observable, I analyze agency problems of ownership concentration by studying block transactions. In particular, I examine the announcement effects of block transactions and the determinants of block premia (as in Banerjee et al., 1997 and Bethel et al., 1998) .
There exists vast empirical literature analyzing block holdings and block transactions within the agency framework.
1 However, the focus has been mainly on developed economies, in which minority investors are relatively well-protected. This paper is one of the first in-depth studies of block transfers in a transition economy. 2 I analyze a sample of block transactions from 1 Recent contributions include Holderness and Sheehan (1988) , Barclay and Holderness (1989 , 1991 , 1992 , Zingales (1994 Zingales ( , 1995 , Sudarsanam (1996) , Keim and Madhavan (1996) , Banerjee et al. (1997) , Bethel et al. (1998) , Dyck and Zingales (2002) . Their findings are summarized in the next section.
2 Gregoric and Vespro (2003) analyze a small sample of block transactions in Slovenian listed firms. Atanasov (2001) investigates block transfers and private benefits of control in a larger sample of Bulgarian companies, but his
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Poland for the following reasons. First, analyzing data from a young market enables me to detect certain phenomena that are specific to corporate governance in emerging markets, such as insufficient protection of minority shareholders' rights, lack of minority shareholders' expertise, and the special role of the State Treasury. Second, a large number of block transactions and little 'legacy' ownership structures in Polish companies make them a particularly interesting object of analysis. Last but not least, employing a so far unexploited data set allows me to avoid the datasnooping bias.
The paper documents the remarkably low level of block premia in Poland which occurs in spite of the inferior governance standards in transition economies. One plausible reason is the presence of liquidity costs that influence the level of block premia. Shareholders expect to benefit from monitoring and corporate restructuring stimulated by block acquirers. Still, shareholders are wary of the expropriation stemming from the extraction of private benefits of control by large block holders. The opportunities to extract such benefits are found to depend not only on the size of the block holder's stake, but also on the relative power of other investors. The additional result of the analysis is that privatizations are perceived less favorably by the market than other types of block transfers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the role of ownership concentration from an agency theory perspective and surveys the related empirical literature. Section 3 develops and motivates research hypotheses concerning the valuation effects of block transactions and determinants of block premia. In the subsequent part, the methodology is explained. Section 5 provides details on data collection procedure and description of variables.
Section 6 outlines the results pertaining to the valuation effects of block transactions, while the next section summarizes the evidence concerning the determinants of block premia. The last section concludes.
sample is restricted to privatization deals only. Finally, the cross-country study by Dyck and Zingales (2002) only includes a tiny set of observations from Czech Republic and Poland.
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Prior research
Theoretical background
The presence of a large shareholder procures benefits, but also comes at a cost. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Kyle and Vila (1991) suggest that the presence of a block holder in a company's ownership structure makes value-increasing takeovers possible, and thus helps to overcome free-rider problems pointed out by Grossman and Hart (1980) . Moreover, Admati et al. (1994) , Maug (1998) , Kahn and Winton (1998) show that in the presence of block holders, costly monitoring takes place despite free-riding behavior of dispersed shareholders. The costs of concentrated ownership may be substantial, however. First, control by a large shareholder results in reduced risk sharing (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Admati et al., 1994) . Second, equity concentration reduces market liquidity (Coffee, 1991; Bolton and Thadden, 1998) . 3 Third, monitoring by an investor holding an equity stake can lead to excessive risk taking in managerial decisions, especially in highly leveraged companies (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Coffee, 1991) .
Fourth, Burkart et al. (1997) and Pagano and Röell (1998) point out that even when tight control by shareholders is ex post efficient, ex ante it constitutes an expropriation threat that reduces managerial incentives to exert effort and undertake value maximising strategies (the so-called 'over-monitoring' effect). Grossman and Hart (1988) stress that a significant stake in a company brings about benefits of control, which can be divided into two classes: private benefits and security benefits.
The latter class includes benefits of ownership concentration that are shared and enjoyed by all shareholders (e.g. positive effects of monitoring). Control rights can also provide (large) investors with private benefits of control, when these investors have access to private information, are able to freeze-out minority shareholders at a price below the value of their shares, and -in extreme cases -can divert resources from security holders to entities controlled by a block holder 3 Coffee (1991) argues that only an illiquid market makes institutional investors intervene rather than sell their stakes. Bolton and Thadden (1998) illustrate that the costs of having a large shareholder may outweigh the benefits, even if the control by block holders always has a positive externality on other shareholders.
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4 (Zwiebel, 1995; Pagano and Röell, 1998; Johnson et al., 2000) . Private benefits of control do not necessarily lead to firm value destruction, but in many cases they may result in inefficiencies.
Thus, although block holdings can be a mechanism that mitigates agency costs resulting from excessive managerial discretion, these block holdings may bring in another type of agency costs.
A large investor may attempt to expropriate small shareholders' rights. Moreover, according to Zwiebel (1995) , private benefits of control can be extracted even if a company has multiple large shareholders. He claims that these benefits are divisible, and parties can enjoy them accordingly to their strategic importance measured by Shapley values. Above some threshold, a large block will not be challenged for control. This encourages extraction of private benefits of control at the expense of dispersed small shareholders, and therefore can induce agency problems between various groups of shareholders.
Sale-of-control transactions (as opposed to tender offers) are not plagued by free-rider and pressure-to-tender problems on the seller's side. Still, efficiency problems do arise because such transactions may well have externality effects on minority shareholders (Bebchuk, 1994) . As a result of such externalities, inefficient transfers of control may occur, and efficient transfers of control may be frustrated. 4 In a similar vein, Burkart et al. (2000) compare various methods of transferring corporate control and conclude that an increase of the block size effectuated via a block transaction, rather than via a tender offer, may signal an inefficient transfer of control. The reason is that transferring control through a block trade preserves the low concentration of the ownership and the corresponding high extraction of private benefits (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000) . 4 Inefficient transfers of control occur when the buyer acquires control to extract private benefits of control rather than to monitor and/or improve company's performance. The value of the firm after such a transaction might decrease, but the acquirer is compensated with excessive private benefits of control for the loss on the value of his shares.
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Empirical evidence on valuation effects of block trades
Earlier studies find that block transfers are accompanied by positive abnormal stock performance, and thus, on average, value creating (Holderness and Sheehan, 1988; Sudarsanam, 1996) . This effect is documented to be present regardless of the price paid in the transaction (Barclay and Holderness, 1989) . The threat of consuming corporate wealth is argued to be absent, since in most companies with a majority shareholder his stake substantially exceeds 50%-threshold (Holderness and Sheehan, 1988) . Barclay and Holderness (1991) claim that changes in control improve corporate governance and increase management turnover as well as the intensity of reorganization activities, rather than bring about additional agency problems.
Therefore, block transactions in which the purchaser gains control receive a much more favorable market reaction than those where this is not the case. The market appraisal of block transfers is more favorable if such block transfers are accompanied by a tender offer on all outstanding shares (Holderness and Sheehan, 1988) . Furthermore, the market also reacts more positively to block transactions for those firms that experience a full acquisition in a post-trade period (Barclay and Holderness, 1992) . Still, even when no subsequent takeover occurs, Sudarsanam (1996) documents that the benefits of ownership concentration outweigh the costs: the announcement effect of a block transaction increases with the size of the stake accumulated by the block acquirer.
More recent studies weaken these unconditionally positive conjectures concerning large shareholders. Banerjee et al. (1997) find no abnormal performance that would accompany block transactions in France. However, they argue that the buyer's identity matters for the valuation effect of the block transfer. Specifically, block acquisitions by holding companies may result in value destruction. Bethel et al. (1998) show that in the US the block purchases by either financial or strategic investors cause no significant market reaction, while acquisitions of blocks by activist shareholders are accompanied by significant positive abnormal performance. Such shareholders usually acquire stakes in poorly performing companies, and subsequently pursue restructuring measures leading to considerable improvement of targets' performance (Nesbitt, 1994) .
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Private benefits of control and determinants of block premia -empirical evidence
The empirical literature provides support for the existence of private benefits of control, which are found to increase with the size of the stake held by a given block holder Holderness, 1989, 1992; Zingales, 1994 Zingales, , 1995 . The benefits depend on ownership structure and vary significantly among countries, possibly due to the differing corporate governance and legal regimes (Nenova, 2003) . Estimates of the value of control range from -4% (in Japan) to 65% (in Brazil) of the value of the company's equity (Dyck and Zingales, 2002) . Moreover, control rents are affected by firm-specific characteristics, such as industry, company size, leverage, risk, prior performance, corporate charter provisions, and particular characteristics of voting rights (Nicodano and Sembenelli, 2000; Dyck and Zingales, 2002; Nenova, 2003) .
Various studies differ with respect to the methodology employed to estimate private benefits of control. Holderness (1989, 1992) argue that private benefits of control are reflected in the block premium calculated relative to the post-transaction price. Nicodano and Sembenelli (2000) argue that this methodology is inappropriate, since it neglects ownership structure characteristics in the analysis of control rents. Instead, following Zwiebel's (1995) suggestion, they posit that the fraction of control rights being transferred in a block trade should be measured by changes in strategic importance of shareholders (proxied by changes of Shapley values). Yet another approach is pioneered by Rydqvist (1987) and Zingales (1994) , who analyze samples of companies with dual-class stocks. Price comparisons of shares carrying different control rights allows then to make inferences about the value of private benefits of control. The recent study by Nenova (2003) employs this methodology to illustrate the differences in the benefits of control across 18 countries.
Research hypotheses
Valuation hypotheses
Much of the prior literature suggests that block transactions should be on average value-creating to the shareholders of the focal firm (e.g., Holderness and Sheehan, 1988; Barclay and Holderness, 1989; Sudarsanam, 1996) . Investors can expect that a block deal is a prelude to Equity block transfers in transition economies: Evidence from Poland 7 an attempted takeover as the acquirer builds a toehold (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) . Positive abnormal performance at the announcement of block transaction may also be due to the expected improvement in corporate governance that would result from an increased intensity of monitoring (cf. Admati et al., 1994; Maug, 1998; Kahn and Winton, 1998) . In both cases, the positive effect of the block transaction should be more pronounced in situations, where the block acquirer is an investor committed to monitor and, possibly, restructure the target company (Bethel et al., 1998) .
5
Such a restructuring is only implemented by an investor who plans a longer-term engagement in a company.
The value of monitoring by the incumbent shareholders is already incorporated in the stock price. A new large investor is likely to contribute new corporate ideas to the target firm (Nesbitt, 1994) . Moreover, he can have monitoring skills different from those of the incumbents.
Consequently, the market reaction to the entry of a new investor provides an estimate for the incremental value creation resulting from the presence of a new block holder.
Hypothesis 1 (Restructuring): The stock price reaction to a block transaction is positive. It is more favorable when the block acquirer is a strategic investor and when he is a new shareholder.
Building up a block by purchasing shares from other large shareholders rather than via a tender offer may indicate that the goal of the acquirer is to extract private benefits at the expense of small investors (Burkart et al., 2000) . When a substantial percentage of equity is dispersed (as it often is the case in Poland), even a relatively small block may give control gains due to large absenteeism of shareholders at their annual general meetings, and due to the information disadvantages potential experienced by small shareholders (Crama et al., 2003) . Dispersed shareholders alone are unlikely to prevent the block holder from extracting excessive private benefits of control, whereas competition among large shareholders could serve this purpose (Bloch and Hege, 2001) . A transaction that increases the ownership concentration (e.g. by means of merging some of the blocks) may result in erosion of the relative voting power of dispersed 5 For institutional reasons (cf. Section 5.2), I refer to such a shareholder as a strategic rather than an activist investor.
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8 shareholders, even if their nominal stake remains unchanged. The larger the damage to their voting power, and hence the higher the likelihood that a block holder would extract private benefits of control, the less favorably the market perceives a given transaction.
Hypothesis 2 (Expropriation):
The stock market reaction to an announcement of a block transaction is negatively related to the change in the relative voting power of dispersed shareholders. Barclay and Holderness (1989) claim that a block trade can be a signal about the prospects of the firm. Under the assumption that block holders have access to superior information, the market infers that transactions in which a seller is ready to liquidate the position at discount (relative to the market price) signal bad corporate prospects. In contrast, transactions concluded at premium convey good news and trigger positive market reactions.
Hypothesis 3 (Superior Information):
Transactions concluded at a premium are followed by a positive abnormal stock performance, while those at a discount are followed by a negative one.
Determinants of block premia
As noted by Grossman and Hart (1988) , Bebchuk (1994), and Zwiebel (1995) , the price paid for a significant fraction of voting rights may reflect the possibility of extracting private benefits of control by the transaction parties.
Hypothesis 4 (Existence of Private Benefits of Control): Acquiring a large fraction of control rights requires a premium above the post-trade market price.
The value of control rights may exceed the post-trade market price if the potential extraction of private benefits of control is high. Moreover, the block trade premium may understate the true value of the private benefits because the owner of the equity block incurs the following two costs: (i) liquidation of a large equity position may be costly; (ii) holding a large Equity block transfers in transition economies: Evidence from Poland 9 block of shares limits the possibilities of risk sharing attainable by portfolio diversification (Admati et al., 1994) .
The premia calculated relative to the pre-transaction price reflect both shared benefits of control (e.g. expected improvement introduced by a block holder) and private benefits of control (Barclay and Holderness, 1992) . After the announcement, the market accounts for the possible value creation due to changes in ownership structure. Therefore the difference between the posttrade share price and the price paid in the block transaction is more informative about private benefits of control (Barclay and Holderness, 1989) . The intuition that the possibilities to extract benefits of control are positively related to the degree of voting power is commonly accepted in the literature (e.g. Holderness, 1989, 1991; Zingales, 1994 Zingales, , 1995 Nicodano and Sembenelli, 2000) . Opinions diverge, however, on the exact functional form of the stipulated relationship. Zwiebel (1995) argues that private benefits of control are divisible and that their allocation depends on ownership structure. 6 A block entitling to 20% of votes in a company with widely dispersed ownership is very likely to award its holder with effective control over the company (Crama et al., 2003) . A block of 25% in a company with a majority shareholder usually does not give its holder significant influence unless supermajority requirements are imposed.
Hence, it is the relative rather than the absolute voting power of a given investor, which determines his ability to enjoy private benefits of control (Crespi and Renneboog, 2003) . This implies that premia paid in block transactions should depend not only on the size of the block, but also on the initial and post-trade ownership structure characteristics. By this I do not only refer to the characteristics of the investors selling and acquiring stakes but also to those of all the investors who may be pivotal in a voting game (Crama et al., 2003) .
Hypothesis 5 (Relative Power):
The premium an investor is ready to pay for the block positively relates to the relative power of a given block holder.
Methodology
Since the publication of Manne's (1965) paper, corporate control is widely recognized in the financial literature as a major corporate asset. Therefore, it is evident that significant changes in ownership structure, and thus in control, constitute a major corporate event (Barclay and Holderness, 1989; Burkart et al., 2000) . If semi-strong market efficiency is imposed, the impact of such an event should immediately be reflected in an appropriate stock price movement. 7 The analysis of block transactions and their perception enables me also to assess the importance of private benefits of control and draw indirect inferences about agency costs emerging from the interaction of shareholders. Thus, in testing for hypotheses developed in Section 3, event study methodology is applied (as do Holderness, 1989, 1991; Keim and Madhavan, 1996; Banerjee et al., 1997) .
Day 0 signifies the trading day following the block transaction, because all the block trades analyzed occurred and were announced after the closing of the downstairs market. 8 The estimation period spans 100 trading days. It ends one month before the event, i.e. the window [-121, -22 ] is used. Such a procedure is appropriate in the analysis of a young market characterized by highly volatile betas. It assures that estimates for the parameters of the benchmark model are not influenced by the event itself (Banerjee et al., 1997) . Therefore, it should render reliable and relevant parameter estimates without imposing too rigid data availability requirements (which could result in survivorship bias). The returns are calculated in logarithmic terms, and so conform better than simple ones to the assumptions of the standard statistical techniques (Strong, 1992) .
7 I assume that the news about block transactions is publicly available information. The plausibility of this assumption might be questioned in the markets characterized by relatively lenient disclosure requirements.
In order to analyze the announcement effect, I assume the event window to be the interval [0, 1] instead of analyzing just abnormal performance on day 0. 9 Such an approach allows for controlling for possible slow reaction of the market, e.g. due to thin trading (MacKinlay, 1997). I employ CAR(0, 1) as the dependent variable in the regression models estimated to test Hypotheses 1-3.
As a benchmark expected return, I employ the market model, which has been shown to outperform alternative specifications (Brown and Warner, 1985) . The parameters of the model are estimated by OLS, where the returns on WIG 10 are taken as a proxy for market returns.
Abnormal return on security i on day τ is then defined as the prediction error from the market Several measures of the level of premia can be found in the literature. The simplest one is the pre-trade premium defined as:
where p bi denotes the price (per share) paid in the i-th block transaction, and p mi is the open market share price before the trade. Analogously to Barclay and Holderness (1989) , for p mi I take 9 Sensitivity checks indicate that the conclusions are robust to alternative definitions of the event window.
10 WIG is a value-weighted index of the Warsaw Stock Exchange. It is the broadest of the Polish stock indices (it includes all the companies listed on the primary market).
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12 the market price on day (-3). A more appropriate way to estimate private benefits of control requires an analysis of standardized block premia. 11 They are calculated according to the formula:
where α i denotes the fraction of voting rights being transferred in the i-th block trade (Barclay and Holderness, 1989) . All the regression models are estimated by OLS. I control for possible heteroskedasticity of an unknown form by employing White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent estimators of the covariance matrix. 13 In all the regressions I check for potential multicollinearity. The procedure 11 Standardized pre-trade premium is employed to test the Superior Information Hypothesis.
12 In most of the cases it is equivalent to the fraction of voting equity being transferred. However, the sample analyzed contains some companies that issued preferred stock. Such stocks have superior voting rights, i.e. they give their bearer the right to exercise more than one vote per share (in my sample -from two up to five, depending on the company). None of the analyzed block trades involved a transfer of preferred stock. Transfer of such equity is very rare in Poland. Furthermore, only common stocks can be traded on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. Transfer of preferred stocks in listed companies requires the permission of the Securities and Exchanges Commission (KPWiG) and is arranged outside the regulated market. 13 In models explaining abnormal stock performance, it can be expected that the heteroskedasticity stems from crosssectional differences in variance of the returns. I attempted to model it explicitly and re-estimated Models 1 and 2 by Weighted Least Squares. The results (not reported) are comparable to those obtained from OLS (cf . Table 3 ).
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employed involves the analysis of Variance Inflation Ratios (VIFs hereafter, Neter et al., 1996) .
A model is abandoned due to the collinearity problem if tolerance level of at least one VIF is lower than 10%. All the models reported are free of collinearity problems.
Data
Data collection
In order to obtain a sample of block trades in Polish listed companies, the archives of Parkiet and Gazeta Wyborcza are examined. 14 These are the most important newspapers providing information on the Polish stock market. In Poland, not all block transactions (even those involving parties that control more than 5% of votes) have to be publicly disclosed and it is therefore not possible to obtain the equivalent of the American SEC 13d filing. Moreover, due to the small size of the Polish market, analysts' coverage is much worse than e.g. in the US. Thus, I
use press data about block trading.
The sample period spans 44 months: from July 1996 until February 2000. Data for the first half of 1996 and earlier years are not available. The initial sample consists of 146 observations. Some observations had to be excluded from the preliminary sample for the following reasons:
• It is not possible to identify at least one of the parties to the transaction.
• Data is unreliable or erroneous.
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• The transaction is a response to a tender offer. Following Barclay and Holderness (1991) , I exclude such transactions from the sample, since the marginal influence of a particular 14 Parkiet is an official newspaper of the Warsaw Stock Exchange. Gazeta Wyborcza is the largest Polish daily newspaper. 15 In two cases, the reported fraction of shares held by all block holders exceeded 100%.
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14 deal on the ownership structure is then difficult to measure. However, I do not exclude transactions which led to subsequent tender offers.
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• The transaction is tied with some other transactions agreed upon or revealed on the same (or very close) date, or more than one deal occurred in the event window. In such cases difficulties in disentangling events occurs.
• The transaction occurs between a company and its subsidiary or among subsidiaries of the same mother-company. In such a case block transaction price may not be very informative (e.g. the transaction may serve as a device of transferring profits within a corporate group).
• One of the transaction parties is a subsidiary of the company whose shares are traded. If such a company acts as a buyer -the deal resembles a share buy-back. If it acts as a seller, the transaction is either some kind of seasoned equity offering, or an anti-takeover mechanism to prevent a hostile takeover.
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As a result, 53 block trades remain in the final sample. The variables characterizing ownership structure before and after a transaction are constructed on the basis of the Parkiet ownership-structure database and the same sources, which are used to retrieve transaction details.
The ownership-structure database is also used to collect data concerning the number of shares outstanding in the company. Stock prices and stock index values are downloaded from the website of the Bank of Environment Protection brokerage house (Bank Ochrony Srodowiska). 16 Excluding such transactions would diminish sample size substantially. The reason for that is that a shareholder who accumulates at least 10% of shares of a company within 90 days is legally obliged to bid for the rest of outstanding shares. Exceptions are the situations when State Treasury is the block seller, or when the transaction concerns preferred stock (and thus is carried out outside the regulated market). 17 Sale of shares to a friendly party can play this role since in Poland subsidiaries cannot exercise their voting rights in the mother company (although they are residual claimants and have dividend rights).
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The stock prices are dividend-and split-adjusted. All accounting data come from the Notoria Serwis databases. Table 1 summarizes descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analyses.
Variable description
[ Table 1 about here]
In order to verify the Restructuring Hypothesis, NEW_INVESTOR and STRATEGIC variables are employed as regressors in the models explaining block transaction announcement effects. NEW_INVESTOR is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the block buyer is a new shareholder to the target company. The STRATEGIC dummy variable equals one when the block acquirer is a strategic investor in the firm. Under Polish regulation, an investor can be granted such a status by the government (in case of privatizations) or by the target firm's board of directors. In return for certain privileges (e.g., negotiable share price or the option to increase the stake in the target firm via private equity placement), strategic investors are obliged to commit to restructuring the target firm.
Relative power of block holders and of the dispersed shareholders is measured by oceanic Shapley values (Milnor and Shapley, 1978) . The notion of oceanic Shapley value (OSV, hereafter) generalizes the concept of Shapley values used in the analyses of finite games (Shapley and Shubik, 1954 ). An implicit assumption in computing OSVs is that the dispersed shareholders (sometimes referred to as the ocean) take part in the voting game, though it may not be easy for them to coordinate. 18 This feature seems quite plausible in the analyzed context. 18 Provided that absenteeism of small investors at the shareholders' meetings is a rule rather than an exception, the approach suggested by Crespi and Renneboog (2003) In the models explaining stock market reactions to the announcements of block
transactions, I include the PRIVATIZATION control dummy variable. It equals one if the State
Treasury is the seller (i.e. for 9 transactions in the sample), and zero otherwise. This variable allows for differences in motives driving privatization decisions and other block sales (Cornelli and Li, 1997) . Moreover, in the sensitivity analyses, I employ PROFITABILITY (defined as the return on equity) and LEVERAGE (proxied by the ratio of total assets to the value of equity) as additional control variables. Shareholder activism may be more beneficial in underperforming firms (Bethel et al., 1998) . Higher indebtedness of the target firm constrains access to free cash flows, making expropriation difficult (Banerjee et al., 1997) . Moreover, highly leveraged firms should also benefit more from direct or indirect decreases in expected bankruptcy costs provided by the new stakeholder.
Several control variables are included in the models explaining the level of block premia as well. Nicodano and Sembenelii (2000) indicate that idiosyncratic firm characteristics can (Shapley and Shubik, 1954) . Applying this approach, my results are qualitatively comparable to those in the regressions reported below. The model fit is usually somewhat weaker. 19 The stakes are always computed on the basis of voting rights controlled by a given investor. Therefore, in some cases they do not coincide with the fraction of cash flow rights (measured by the fraction of shares held) that characterize those stakes.
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influence the value of control rights in a company. Unfortunately, the small size of the sample does not allow to control for industry-specific effects. I do include, however, variables capturing company profitability, risk, and size. Dyck and Zingales (2002) argue that a troubled company may inflict a loss in reputation to the controlling party and, in extreme cases, even some legal liabilities. Hence, the value of control may be lower in underperforming firms. I include the PROFITABILITY variable to control for such a possibility. Company risk is proxied by the standard deviation of percentage daily returns on a company's stock within the estimation period.
Inclusion of the RISK variable is motivated by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) who argue that monitoring by a large shareholder increases in value, and hence concentrated ownership will be more likely, as the company's risk increases. Barclay and Holderness (1989) suggest that block holders in larger firms enjoy greater pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits. However, the cost of holding a block is higher for large companies (Franks et al., 2001) . The reasons for that may be the costs of financing the block or an excessive imperfectly diversifiable risk (Nenova, 2003) . If the market is not deep enough (in the sense of Kyle, 1985) , it might be difficult for a block holder to liquidate a very big position.
Finally, large companies are usually subject to more extensive tracking by analysts and monitors, which makes the extraction of private benefits of control more difficult. The FIRM_SIZE variable (defined as the natural logarithm of market capitalization expressed in millions PLN) is meant to control for those effects.
20
In a sensitivity analysis, I use LEVERAGE as a control variable in the models explaining the block premia. High levels of debt might both increase and reduce control rents (Nicodano and Sembenelli, 2000) . Increasing the leverage has a twofold effect. On the one hand, it can increase the size of the company, and thus help to overcome the owners' wealth constraints (Stulz, 1988) .
On the other hand, it can constrain managerial discretion by restrictive covenants, and by the 20 Market capitalization is computed as the product of the number of the shares outstanding and the share price on the day preceding a block transaction.
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18 obligation to pay out future cash flows (Harris and Raviv, 1988) , which reduces the possibility of extracting perquisites of control.
Block holders' characteristics might affect the investors' ability to extract private benefits of control. 21 In order to control for the possible heterogeneity of block acquirers, I employ the STRATEGIC dummy in sensitivity analyses. There is no reason to assume that all the sellers in block transactions are homogeneous either. They can also pursue various goals. For instance, when the State Treasury is selling its stake in a formerly state-owned company it possibly takes into account other factors than obtaining the maximal possible price for the block. It may follow the criterion of maximizing incumbent stakeholders' interests (which could mean, e.g. sustaining employment) rather than obtaining the highest price (Cornelli and Li, 1997) . Therefore I include the PRIVATIZATION dummy in the sensitivity tests as well. Table 2 supports the claim that a block transaction is a major corporate event that leads to significantly positive abnormal stock performance around the announcement date. Therefore, the event study results support the Restructuring Hypothesis postulating that expected improvement of corporate governance is induced by a transfer of control. No support for the Superior Information Hypothesis is found: the differences in market perception of a block transactions concluded at a premium versus those concluded at a discount are statistically insignificant.
Valuation effects of block transactions
[ Table 2 about here] Table 3 reports the regression models explaining the valuation effects of block transactions. The stock market perceives a block transaction more favorably if the buyer is a 21 Shleifer and Vishny (1997) give a Russian example of such differences. They point out that a Western investor can control a Russian company with 75 percent ownership, whereas a Russian investor can do so with only 25 percent stake. Although in other markets, legal protection of all investors is usually (more) equal, the discrepancies can emerge due to differences in monitoring abilities of different shareholders. Moreover, some of the private benefits of control (e.g. synergies) can be enjoyed only by a particular group of investors. [ Table 3 about here]
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Investors expect that block acquirers' activism benefits the firm value. Still, the shareholders seem to worry that when the acquirer's control power is unlikely to be challenged, the expropriation threat is more credible. In such cases, accumulating even a small block may provide its holder with effective control. Transactions that reduce the relative voting power of the dispersed shareholders are perceived less favorably than deals preserving (or increasing) their strength. The stock market reaction to a block transaction announcement (i.e., CAR(0, 1)) and the change in the OSV of the oceanic shareholders are negatively related. Since this effect is significant (at the 10% level), Models 1 and 2 provide some support for the Expropriation Hypothesis. The apparent concern of the Polish market about possible expropriation of small investors is in line with findings of La Porta et al. (1998) . They document inferior minority shareholders' protection in the non-Anglo-American corporate governance systems.
The Superior Information Hypothesis postulates that the level of the block premia signals the prospects of the firm. However, Model 2 rejects the claim that the market reacts to such a signal: the relationship between the block trade announcement effect and the level of the premia is insignificant. 22 Hence, the Superior Information Hypothesis is rejected.
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The signs corresponding to the PRIVATIZATION dummy are negative. Privatizations are not favorably received by the market (relative to other block transactions). This seems counterintuitive for two reasons. In (partly) state owned companies, management can be subject to political pressures. Additionally, the State's objectives may be different from profit maximization. For instance, the State could stimulate to maintain employment at too high levels (Cornelli and Li, 1997) . Consequently, privatizations are expected to result in efficiency gains (Aghion and Blanchard, 1998) . If a transfer of control from a public to a private owner is to improve company performance, it should be perceived more favorably (or at least not less favorably) than a block transaction agreed on by private investors. This claim seems doubtful in the light of my results. Possibly, additional covenants included in privatization deals (e.g.
conditions sustaining the level of employment, or imposing some investment requirements) are suboptimal from the investors' point of view, making such block acquisitions less attractive.
Furthermore, shareholder activism by the State may bring about benefits for the dispersed shareholders. 23 For instance, the presence of the State in the ownership structure may limit opportunities for other block holders to inefficiently extract private benefits of control.
As a sensitivity check I examine the effects of the inclusion of LEVERAGE and of PROFITABILITY as additional control variables. Neither of the two prove significant as a determinant of CARs(0, 1), while none of the conjectures of the models summarized in Table 3 are challenged.
Determinants of block premia
The levels of block premia can be used to estimate the value of private benefits of control.
Hypothesis 4 postulates that substantial blocks of shares provide opportunities to extract private benefits of control. That is why the acquisition of a block occurs at a premium over the market price. The data support this hypothesis (see Table 1 ). The relatively low level of observed block premia in the Polish market is striking. The average of 0.98% falls in the lower end of the estimate ranges reported by Dyck and Zingales (2002) or Nenova (2003) for various countries. 25 Moreover, every third transaction in the sample analyzed here involves a discount rather than a premium. The claim that private benefits of control in Poland are comparably low to those in the most developed market economies characterized by good investor protection seems implausible. An alternative explanation may be the presence of liquidity costs faced by block holders in Poland. Some evidence for this argument follows also from the regressions below.
In the regression models, I employ the standardized post-trade premium as a dependent variable. Apart from having better statistical properties than the simple block premia, the standardized post-trade premium has also an intuitive interpretation, i.e. the value of private benefits as a percentage of the total value of the firm's equity (Barclay and Holderness, 1989) .
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The estimation results are summarized in Table 4 .
[ Table 4 about here]
In line with the Relative Power Hypothesis, larger incremental changes of the strategic importance of block transaction parties are related to larger premia. In Models 3 and 4, the 24 When I limit the analysis to companies following the one-share-one-vote rule, the results for this sub-sample of 39 observations (not reported) are very similar to the ones obtained for the whole sample. Hence, I argue that the presence of companies issuing preferred stock in the sample does not affect the conclusions. 25 The former paper estimates private benefits of control in Poland to constitute about 11% of the market value of equity. This result is based on just four block transactions.
26 Models explaining the simple post-trade premia render virtually identical results.
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22 coefficients corresponding to the changes of OSV for the seller and for the buyer have the expected signs and the former one is highly significant. 27 Model 5 tends to indicate that larger sellers with strong voting power (as measured by the respective OSV) are able to obtain higher premia for the blocks sold, but the effect falls short of being statistically significant. According to Model 6, the larger the post-trade relative power of the buyer, the higher is the block premium paid. The coefficient corresponding to the post-trade OSV of the buyer is significantly positive.
The Relative Power Hypothesis is therefore supported. The relative power of block holders determines the level of block premia and the ownership structure seem to affect the opportunities of extracting private benefits of control.
28
My results reject the positive relationship between firm performance and the value of control postulated by Dyck and Zingales (2002) . The estimated effect of the PROFITABILITY variable is consistently negative (and highly significant) across Models 3-6. It appears that the possibilities to extract private benefits of control in poorly performing companies are higher than in those that do better. In the latter ones, factors other than extraction of control rents (e.g. strategic reasons) might be relatively more important determinants of block acquisition decisions.
RISK emerges as another variable that has a significant impact on private benefits of control. Apparently, control is more valuable in riskier firms. This result is consistent with option-like character of equity. Though significant only in Model 3, the estimate corresponding to the FIRM_SIZE variable persists to be negative across all four specifications. This result seems to suggest that in Poland, the liquidity costs in the market for blocks may be of some importance.
The costs associated with holding a large block (in value terms) appear large enough to outweigh 27 The change of the seller's OSV is a non-positive number. Hence, the corresponding coefficient is expected to be negative. 28 Another way of modeling the relationship between the ownership structure and potential control benefits extraction would be allowing the level of premia to depend directly on some ownership concentration measure (e.g. Herfindahl index) as well. The models of that kind were abandoned due to the collinearity between Herfindahl index and OSVbased measures. In models where OSV-based is replaced by the Herfindahl index, the latter variable has a positive and significant effect, while none of the results from Table 3 are materially different.
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the positive impact of a company's size on the value of private benefits of control hypothesized by other studies.
I also perform some additional sensitivity tests. LEVERAGE itself is insignificant, but the significance of some other estimates is affected (possibly by a decreased sample size). Still, the main conclusions of Models 3-6 remain upheld. I also attempt to control for the identities of the transaction parties, and added the PRIVATIZATION or STRATEGIC dummies to the model specifications discussed above. Block premia paid in privatizations are usually slightly higher, but neither of the two variables considered are consistently significant. None of the main conclusions purporting to the other variables is materially different.
All the models presented in this section are estimated using the sample of non-insurance companies (for which the PROFITABILITY variable is defined). Qualitatively, the same results can be obtained for the whole sample, as well as for various sub-samples. Such sub-samples include all non-financial companies, firms following the one-share-one-vote rule, non-privatization sample. However, due to smaller sizes of the sub-samples, the significance of estimates is usually slightly lower than in the models reported here.
Discussion and concluding remarks
The current paper presents an empirical analysis of the Polish equity block market. Most of the previous studies examining block trades investigate the American stock market and the well-developed European markets. Hardly any empirical work has been performed to study these issues for the emerging markets of Central Europe. One of the main reasons is that these markets, including the Polish one, are young, which makes it impossible to track the companies in the longer period after block transactions.
The results show that the transfer of control rights that takes place in block trades in , and ** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively (for one-tailed tests). 
